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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP RoY SMITH, an infant, 
by Andrew J. Smith, his 
Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IGNACIO THEODORE GALLEGOS 
and WAsATCH CoNSTRUCTION 
CoMPANY, Defendants, Third Case No. 10226 
Party Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
WILLIAM JEWELL JONES and 
MIL WHITE MuD SALES CoMPANY, 
a corporation 
Defendants, Third 
Party Defendants and 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellants appeal from a jury verdict finding them 
liable for damages and injuries sustained by the respondent 
William Jewel Jones arising out of a collision at the inter-
section of 3500 South and Redwood Road, Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The respondent accepts the statement in the appellants' 
brief as to the disposition in the trial court. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the jury's verdict in his 
favor should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents submit the following statement of facts as 
being more in accord with the principle of law that on 
appeal the facts will be reviewed in a light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict and in fact a more accurate statement 
of what actually occurred. The instant action was filed by 
Phillip Roy Smith against both the appellants and respond-
ents and Milwhite Mud Sales Company for injuries Smith 
allegedly sustained as a result of a collision between the 
vehicle operated by the appellant Ignacio Theodore Gal-
legos and owned by Wasatch Construction Company and 
a vehicle owned and operated by the respondent William 
J. Jones. Subsequent to the filing of the action, the claim 
of Phillip R. Smith was dismissed. Gallegos and Wasatch 
Construction Company, the appellants, had cross-claimed 
against William J. Jones who in tum had cross-claimed for 
damages to his truck and injuries to his person. These latter 
claims were the subject of the trial which resulted in aver-
dict for the respondent in the sum of $9,661.46 from which 
the appellants appeal. 
The collision which is the subject of the instant action 
occurred on the 7th day of September, 1961 at 8:30 p.m. 
at the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood Road, Salt 
Lake County ( R. 24 7) . Redwood Road on the north side 
of 3500 South is a four lane highway with two lanes running 
each way. On the north side of Redwood Road, there is a 
collection lane for vehicles turning left. There was a signal 
semaphore at the time of the accident at the intersection 
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with three operating colors- red, green and caution (R. 
259). The speed limit on Redwood Road is 40 m.p.h. (R. 
264) . At the time of the accident there was no collection 
lane for vehicles south of 3500 South (R. 265, 276). North 
of 3500 South, Redwood Road widens and is narrower 
south of the intersection. On the 7th day of September, 
1961, Theodore Gallegos, an employee of Wasatch Con-
struction Company, was hauling dirt from an area south 
of 3500 South Redwood Road to Rose Park (R. 304). He 
was paid on the basis of the number of trips he made (R. 
311). William J. Jones had picked up a load of barite and 
was hauling the load south on Redwood Road (T. 333). 
Mr. Jones' vehicle consisted of a truck and trailer combina-
tion loaded with 25 tons of material. The truck weighed 
26,000 pounds alone (T. 333). Wasatch Construction Com-
pany's truck, operated by Gallegos, was loaded with 21 tons 
of dirt (R. 309). 
At approximately 8: 30 p.m., the truck operated by Gal-
legos approached the intersection of 3500 South traveling 
30 to 40 m.p.h. (T. 294, 306). As he approached the inter-
section, the light was red and at a point approximately 200 
to 300 feet from the intersection turned green ( R. 307) . 
According to Gallegos, he had been following an old Pon-
tiac which at the intersection pulled over to make a left tum 
(T. 296, 306). Jones had heretofore approached the inter-
section at 3500 South, pulled into the left turn lane and 
signaled to make a left turn east onto 3500 South (T. 332, 
335). As he was stopped at the light, he noticed cars lined 
up across the intersection headed north on Redwood Road 
and in the left hand lane facing north (T. 336). Gallegos 
testified that he saw no such vehicles (T. 312). However, 
Marcus F. Richardson, who was parked on the east side of 
the intersection of 3500 South and Redwood Road, testi-
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fied there were four vehicles on the south side of the inter-
section on Redwood Road waiting to tum left and west onto 
3500 South (T. 322). 
Jones testified that as the light changed, there was no on-
coming traffic and vehicles across the road started to turn 
west. He pulled onto the intersection to tum east and saw 
no obstructions to his making a left tum onto 3500 South. 
He testified: 
"A. Well, when the light changed to green the car 
that was sitting at an angle started to make a turn 
to the west, this was the left hand turn for it and 
I checked and everything was clear as far as I 
could see. I started my left hand turn and I 
glanced back in my mirror, my rear view mirror 
on the left to check my trailer to see if it was clear-
ing the island in the center and at that time I was 
pretty well in my turn. I was pretty well across 
Redwood Road into the other road going east, 
that would be 3500. And when I looked back why 
those lights to the extreme east of the road, to my 
south, was bearing down on me." 
The Wasatch Construction Company truck, traveling at a 
high rate of speed (Exhibit 23), struck the Jones vehicle on 
the right hand side of the cab door knocking the vehicle 7 to 
8 feet to the north and east (T. 268, Exhibit 10) and knock-
ing Mr. Smith, who was a passenger in the Jones vehicle, 
into the street. The appellant's vehicle then continued to 
the east where it collided with three other vehicles on 3500 
South. 
Mr. Marcus Richardson, a Superintendent at Hercules 
Powder Company ( T. 319), was waiting at the intersec-
tion of 3500 South Redwood Road facing west. He ob-
served Gallegos' vehicle at 175 to 200 feet south of the inter-
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section. He stated that he heard a blast on an air horn and 
when he looked, Jones had started his left turn because 
there was no other traffic on the outside lane going north 
(T. 319). He stated that the Gallegos vehicle pulled out to 
the right of the vehicles waiting to make a left tum west onto 
3500 South and passed these vehicles and entered the inter-
section. He estimated that the Gallegos vehicle was going 
40 to 45 m.p.h. when it entered the intersection (T. 319). 
He stated that the engine was roaring as if it was under 
power and that he felt there was no reduction in speed up to 
the time of impact (T. 319- 320). He testified definitely 
that at the time he first observed the Gallegos vehicle that 
it was not in the outside lane but that it pulled into the out-
side lane and passed stopped cars as it entered the intersec-
tion (T. 325). Mr. Gene Matthews, a witness who was 
called by the appellants, testified that he was waiting for the 
light on 3500 South facing east; that he saw the Jones 
vehicle parked on the inner left hand lane. He testified: 
(R-290) 
"A. As he was observed I was just sitting waiting for 
the light and I said to my wife, "Why don't that 
light change?" I figured, there was no traffic 
coming, and I figured he should make a turn and 
I looked up and it looked to me like it changed to 
yellow and this car in front of me made the turn 
and about the same time Mr. Jones started his 
tum. 
"Q. Which way was he turning? 
"A. He was turning to the east off of Redwood Road. 
And about that time my wife said-there is going 
to be an accident-and I heard the truck that 
Mr. Gallegos was driving, being a diesel, I heard 
him pick up like they was going to make the 
light. * * *" 
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There were no skid marks from the Gallegos vehicle at the 
intersection (T. 278). The appellant Gallegos testified that 
it was doubtful if you could skid a vehicle with a 21 ton load 
( T. 309) . The respondent Jones who had had long experi-
ence as a truck driver (T. 329), testified that applying 
brakes on a heavily loaded truck will cause the wheels to 
lock and cause the wheels to slide (T. 330). 
The testimony of appellant Gallegos was that as he ap-
proached the intersection, he remained in the same lane 
that he had been traveling (T. 306-307). He had been 
following an old Pontiac which pulled over for a left hand 
tum (T. 306). As the light turned green, he saw the Jones 
vehicle in the left hand tum lane (T. 307). When he first 
saw the vehicle, it was moving slow to tum to the left (T. 
307). He testified he was approximately 150 feet from the 
vehicle, traveling 15 to 20 m.p.h. (T. 308). He stated he 
stepped on the brakes, blew the horn and turned to the right 
to avoid the accident (T. 308). He was unable to avoid the 
accident and his left bumper collided with the Jones vehicle. 
The appellants offered in evidence Exhibit 23 which was 
a statement not in the handwriting of the respondent, but 
the statement was signed by him (T. 341, 342). There-
spondent did not recall giving the statement (T. 341) or 
making statements to police as were contained in the state-
ment (T. 341-345). 
Based upon the above evidence, the jury returned aver-
dict for respondent. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN FAIL-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT AGAINST RESPONDENT. 
The appellants' sole contention on appeal is that the trial 
court erred in not ruling that the respondent was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. The trial court denied 
the appellants' request for such a ruling and submitted the 
issue of the negligence of appellants and respondent to the 
JUry. 
In Coombsv. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P.2d 680 ( 1954), 
this Court observed with reference to the rule regarding its 
review of a trial court's decision to submit a matter of fact 
to the jury's determination, and the subsequent verdict: 
"The basis of defendant's appeal is that the evidence so 
conclusively supports his views as to these two points 
that the court was required to so rule as a matter of 
law and should not have submitted the matter to the 
jury. The plaintiff having won a judgment below, 
the verdict is protected by a bulwark of rules firmly 
established in our law. First, by the general proposition 
that the judgment and proceedings in the lower court 
are presumptively correct with the burden upon de-
fendant to show error. Second, where a trial judge has 
passed upon a question and a jury, presumably fair 
and impartial, has made a finding, while such is not 
controlling, it is at least entitled to some consideration 
and should not be wholly ignored in reviewing the situ-
ation and attempting to see, as objectively as possible, 
whether reasonable minds might so conclude. Third, 
that the court must review the evidence, together with 
every inference fairly arising therefrom, in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, and similarly, must 
consider any lack or failure of evidence in the same 
light, which we do in reviewing the facts here." 
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It has long been the rule in this state that a decision of a 
trial court in refusing to rule that a party was negligent as a 
matter of law will not be disturbed on appeal, unless, under 
the facts taken in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination, it appears no reasonable man could but con-
clude otherwise. jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404,367 P.2d 
191 ( 1962); Mulbach v. Hertig, 15 Utah 2d 121,388 P.2d 
414 (1964); Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 
121 Utah 37,239 P.2d 163. 
It is submitted that when the evidence is viewed in light 
of the above rules it is manifestly clear that the trial court's 
decision and the verdict of the jury are not contrary to law. 
The appellants contend that in two ways the evidence as 
a matter of law demands a finding of the respondent's negli-
gence. First, it is contended the respondent was negligent as 
a matter of law in failing to yield the right of way. Second, 
it is contended the respondent failed to keep a proper look-
out. 
As to the appellants' contention that respondent was 
negligent in failing to yield the right of way reliance is 
placed on 41-6--73, U.C.A., 1953 (Laws of Utah 1961, Ch. 
86, § 1 ) . This statute provides: 
"The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intend-
ing to turn to the left shall yield the right of way to any 
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which 
is within the intersection or so close thereto as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard, during the time when 
such driver is moving within the intersection." 
It is submitted this provision makes very little change 
over the previous provision. A vehicle making a left turn 
need only yield the right of way to an approaching vehicle 
if ( 1 ) the approaching vehicle has entered the intersection 
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or (2) is so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. In 
Kronish v. Provasoli, 179 A.2d 823 (Conn., 1962), the Con-
necticut Supreme Court stated with reference to the same 
statute and in holding the plaintiff who was making a left 
tum not to have been contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law: 
"If, however, the defendant's approaching car was 
neither within the intersection nor so close thereto as 
to constitute an immediate hazard, and the plaintiff's 
car was within the intersection, the plaintiff would 
have the right of way to make a left turn ... " 
The facts in the instant case when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict show that the question of 
negligence was properly a question for the triers of fact. 
The respondent approached the intersection at Redwood 
Road and 3500 South from the north. He stopped his ve-
hicle at the red light and was in the far left hand collection 
lane. He had his left tum signals in operation ( R. 333) as 
well as his lights on (R. 334). As the light changed, ac-
cording to Jones, "I checked and everything was clear as far 
as I could see" ( R. 336). He started his left turn. Accord-
ing to Mr. Marcus Richardson, "Mr. Jones' vehicle had 
started his left turn because there was no other traffic on the 
outside lane going north" (R. 319). Even the appellants' 
own witness, Mr. Gene Matthews, testified that the inter-
section appeared clear, and the appellant's vehicle picked 
up speed like it was trying to clear the intersection before 
the light changed (R. 290). According to Jones, when he 
entered the intersection, the only vehicles were those di-
rectly south lined up to make left turns west onto 3500 
South. This was corroborated by the other witnesses. 
Further, the point of impact on the diagram shows that the 
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Jones vehicle was well across both opposite lanes of traffic 
and that the collision occurred almost on a line with the 
edge of the road of the southeast side of Redwood Road. 
The appellant Gallegos' testimony was that when the light 
at the intersection turned from red to green he was some 
200 to 250 feet from the intersection ( R. 307) . This was the 
time Jones said he started to make his turn. Gallegos was 
150 feet from the intersection when he observed the re-
spondent who was making a left turn (R. 308). Clearly, 
therefore, the evidence supports a view that at the time the 
respondent started to make his left tum, the intersection 
was free of any vehicle that could be called an "immediate 
hazard." Further, according to both Mr. Matthews and 
Mr. Marcus Richardson, the appellant Gallegos seemed to 
accelerate into the intersection under power. Mr. Richard-
son testified that the appellant's vehicle was in the left hand 
lane behind several cars, and that it pulled out behind the 
cars to the right, was under full power, 40 to 45 m.p.h., 
bearing down on the intersection. The jury could well con-
clude that Jones entered the intersection without there be-
ing any immediate hazard but because the appellant pulled 
into another lane, passed vehicles and approached at a high 
rate of speed, the sole negligence and proximate cause of 
the accident was the appellant's. 
It is well settled that a motorist who enters an intersec-
tion to make a left turn prior to another vehicle and under 
circumstances that do not manifest an immediate hazard 
has the right of way and subsequent approaching vehicles 
must yield. Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P.2d 74 7 
( 1952) ; Kronish v. Provasoli, 179 A.2d 823 (Conn., 1962); 
Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209 ( 1955). In the 
latter case, this Court observed: 
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"Plaintiff not only entered the intersection first, he had 
nearly passed over it before defendant entered. Plain-
tiff was the disfavored driver until he had entered the 
intersection at a time when no car ~raveling the 
through highway had entered the intersection or was 
approaching so closely on said through highway as to 
constitute an immediate hazard. But having entered 
as authorized, he became the favored driver and all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection on said 
through highway were obliged to yield the right of way 
to him.'' 
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 
( 195 9) , this Court observed : 
"It is clear that the defendant entered the intersection 
considerably ahead of the plaintiff. The question then 
becomes whether plaintiff's automobile was so close to 
the intersection to constitute an 'immediate hazard' 
to defendant when the latter entered the intersection. 
There is, of course, no precise set of measurements by 
which an immediate hazard can be gauged. It must be 
judged on the basis of common sense in the light of 
existing circumstances. In reference to a similar situa-
tion the Supreme Court of Delaware has said that 
an 'immediate hazard' is created when a vehicle ap-
proaches an intersection on a favored street at a rea-
sonable speed under such circumstances that, if the 
disfavored driver proceeds into the intersection it will 
force the favored driver to sharply and suddenly check 
his progress or stop in order to avoid collision. Con-
versely, if the disfavored driver has made his stop and 
deferred to all vehicles that would be required to go 
into a sharp or sudden braking to avoid collision, the 
cars far enough away have a clear margin to observe 
and make a smooth and safe stop are not an 'immedi-
ate hazard' and are required to yield to the driver 
already at the intersection." 
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Clearly, the facts presented in the instant case raised 
issues that could only be resolved by the jury. The facts 
clearly will support a finding that the appellant's vehicle 
pulled out of its regular lane of traffic after the respondent 
had entered the intersection and commenced his tum, and 
thereafter proceeded at a high rate of speed into the inter-
section. Further, since there were no skid marks and re-
spondent testified that a vehicle such as appellant's could be 
skidded, it may be inferred that no effort to brake was 
made. In Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291 
( 1954), this Court was faced with a claim similar to that 
now before the Court. It observed: 
"The driver going straight through the intersection does 
have the right of way. This means that where the cir-
cumstances are such that if the two continued their 
course there would be danger of collision, the left 
turner must give way. It is recognized that right of 
, way, based on direction of travel, is the best and most 
easily applied rule as to driver preference at inter-
sections. But in the very nature of things, it cannot be 
absolute. If it were, in any situation where there was 
considerable traffic, it would be a practical impossi-
bility to safely make a left turn, no matter how long 
one waited, nor with what care he proceeded; the 
driver proceeding directly through would have com-
plete license to commit any kind of negligence and 
claim the right of way under all circumstances, regard-
less of speed, lookout, distance away when he observed 
the left turner, and notwithstanding his own lack of 
care, always lay the responsibility upon the person 
making the left turn. It is so plain as to hardly war-
rant expression that one cannot, consistent with reason 
and justice, determine beforehand that in every case 
involving such an intersection collision, the driver 
making the left turn is solely responsible for the mis-
hap. As in all cases of collision, both drivers are re-
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quired to exercise that degree of care which a reason-
ably prudent person under the circumstances would 
exercise for his own and others' safety, and where the 
failure of a party to meet this standard is a contribut-
ing cause of the accident, no relief can be had on his 
behalf. Under the circumstances here, where the de-
fendant was in the intersection substantially ahead of 
plaintiff in time, and was making the left tum when 
the plaintiff was far enough away that ordinary rea-
sonable care would require that he not insist upon 
claiming the right of way, plaintiff cannot race on into 
the intersection and rely on it to exculpate himself 
from wrong.'' 
The appellants cite Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 
169 P.2d 777 ( 1946) and French v. Utah Oil Refining Co.:J 
117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950) for the proposition 
that the respondent was negligent as a matter of law. The 
facts in both those cases are materially different than those 
in the instant case. The facts in this case when viewed most 
favorably to the jury's verdict are substantially at variance 
with the facts of the above mentioned cases. It is submitted 
that this case is more within the rule of Hardman v. Thur-
man) 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 ( 1951) where the facts 
closely parallel the claims of the respondent in this case. 
There, the Court observed that the French and Cederloff 
cases were not applicable and stated: 
"In the instant case, the jury might reasonably conclude 
that when the tanker truck stopped in the first lane east 
of the center of State Street and another motor vehicle 
stopped in the second lane, Mrs. Hardman was in the 
exercise of reasonable case in assuming that it was safe 
to proceed eastward! y. In view of the street plan at 
the intersection, it might reasonably be found that it 
was not unreasonable for her to not expect any through 
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traffic on lane 3 in which defendants' vehicle was pro-
ceeding, since there are only two lanes for north bound 
traffic north of the intersection. She proceeded cau-
tiously, and while she was crossing the first two traffic 
lanes she might well have been unable to see the de-
fendants' vehicle since it would have been some dis-
tance south of the intersection when she first started to 
turn. Facing headlights of the two vehicles which were 
stopped to permit her to turn safely to the left she 
might not have been able to see the top of the trailer-
truck 13 feet above the pavement. Under the circum-
stances, the jury could reasonably find that she exer-
cised due care. The evidence was such as to warrant 
a finding that she and not the defendants' driver had 
the right of way. 
"The evidence was such as to require submission of the 
case to the jury, consequently the court did not err in 
denying the motion for the directed verdict." 
It is submitted therefore that there is no basis for the 
appellants' claim that respondent was contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law in failing to yield the right of way. 
The jury was instructed on the right of way issue, no ex-
ceptions were taken by the appellants and the jury deter-
mined the facts against the appellants. That verdict should 
stand. 
The appellants contend that the respondent was negli-
gent as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. 
The record reflects that the jury was full instructed and 
advised on that issue. They apparently felt that ( 1) the 
respondent maintained an adequate lookout under the cir-
cumstances, and/or (2) that any failure to maintain an 
adequate lookout was not the proximate cause of the acci-
dent. 
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The major basis for the appellants' position is the testi-
mony of the respondent (R. 336--337) to the effect that as 
he started his turn, and after checking to see everything 
"was clear," he thereafter "glanced back" in his mirror to 
check to see if his trailer was clearing the island. When he 
looked back, the appellant's vehicle was "bearing down." 
The appellants further contend that the respondent's state-
ment made to the police that he thought he had a green tum 
light with him supports their contention. The respondent 
denied making such a statement, and the statement was not 
in his handwriting. The jury might well believe the re-
spondent's testimony that he did not so state, nor did he mis-
understand the semaphore. Therefore, this allegation of 
the appellants could have been properly disregarded by the 
jury, and therefore in viewing the facts most favorable to 
the respondent, the appellants may only rely upon the re-
spondent's testimony. 
The facts concerning the accident clearly reveal that the 
jury was properly allowed to decide the matter. When the 
respondent was starting his tum the appellant's vehicle was 
far down the road behind several other cars. The respond-
ent's view of both approaching lanes would show no danger. 
The respondent merely "glanced backward." This would 
be a reasonable and prudent action, since if the trailer did 
not clear the island, the vehicle would be a serious hazard 
to oncoming traffic. The respondent then looked forward, 
and appellant's vehicle had moved out of the lane it was in 
and was speeding forward possibly to make the light. Noth-
ing the respondent could have done would have prevented 
the accident for the sole and proximate cause was the speed 
and action of the appellant's vehicle. The respondent had a 
right to rely upon nonfavored drivers slowing down at the 
intersection and yielding the right of way. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, 
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Automobiles and Highway TrafficJ § 736. Generally, the 
question of whether a proper lookout was maintained under 
the circumstances is a jury question. In Covington v. Car-
penter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P.2d 788 ( 1956), this Court ob-
served on the lookout question: 
"Rarely do two motor vehicles collide without a claim 
and counterclaim by the drivers that failure to keep a 
proper lookout has at least contributed to cause the 
misfortune. As a consequence this court has many 
times considered the duty of a driver to keep such look-
out under varying circumstances and conditions. Mod-
ern traffic complexities make it impossible to lay down 
by judicial rule what will always be, or fail to be, rea-
sonable care in the operation of motor vehicles. The 
duty to keep a proper lookout is manifest but the 
obedience to or violation of that duty must be deter-
mined according to particular circumstances and in 
full accord with the constantly varying exigencies 
occasioning each accident. As to what constitutes a 
proper lookout is usually, therefore, a latter-day classic 
question for jury determination, and each trial and 
appellate court must determine the question as a mat-
ter of law only when convinced that reasonable per-
sons could not disagree upon the question when con-
scientiously applying fact to law." 
See also Spackman v. CarsonJ 117 Utah 390, 216 P.2d 
640; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772. 
Certainly the facts in this case raise a jury question. The 
jury might well have decided that the appellant's speed 
and operation of his vehicle was the sole proximate cause. 
That in view of the way appellant's vehicle pulled out of the 
lane it was in, over into the far hand lane which was narrow 
and approached at a high rate of speed, that any momen-
tary glance by the respondent was of little concern, see 
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Hardman v. Thurman, supra, and that the proximate cause 
of the collision was appellant's speed. A similar situation 
existed in Bates v. Burns, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P.2d 209 
( 1955) where in an excellent opinion by Justice Worthen, 
this Court observed : 
"There is no question that plaintiff, under the most 
favorable evidence, was careful and free from negli-
gence as he began to move from the stop sign. It is 
urged that plaintiff was looking west and continued 
to do so as he entered the intersection when he should 
have been looking for traffic from the east. But until 
plaintiff reached the center of the intersection he was 
concerned only with traffic coming from the west. 
"The evidence discloses that plaintiff looked to the east 
when he was about 10 feet north of the center line -
at that time defendant was about 150 feet east of the 
point of impact." 
* * * 
"To say that a person is negligent as a matter of law for 
traveling across a through highway at 5 or 6 miles an 
hour is to say that many people with truck, tractor, 
farm equipment and wagon have no rights, and cross 
such highway at their risk. 
"We are not ready to say that as a matter of law plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence in traversing said intersection 
at that speed. It was a proper question to be answered 
by the jury under proper instructions. The jury an-
swered it in the negative. 
"Let it be assumed that the plaintiff was negligent in 
not looking as he crossed over the center line and into 
the northbound lanes of traffic, still, that negligence, 
if any, was not shown to be the proximate cause or a 
proximately contributory cause of the collision. Plain-
tiff's position and defendant's position were still as safe 
at the time plaintiff crossed the center line and until 
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he was 10 feet beyond as if he had diligently surveyed 
the highway. 
"Had plaintiff looked just prior to, or at the time of, 
crossing the center line, defendant's position would 
not have alerted plaintiff to any danger- then de-
fendant would have been further away from the inter-
section than at the time he did look. Had plaintiff 
looked it would not have affected defendant's driving 
or speed. Defendant testified that he never saw plain-
tiff till defendant was within 100 feet of the intersec-
tion. Unless plaintiff had been able to cast some 
hypnotic spell over defendant his looking earlier would 
have had no effect on the collision. 
"It is suggested that if plaintiff had looked before he 
crossed the center line he could have stopped or 
speeded up or turned to the left. However, had plain-
tiff looked as he was about to start across the center 
line, there would have been nothing to alert plaintiff 
to any danger or occasion for a changed course. De-
fendant was then still further away. Any sense of dan-
ger would have been less then, than 2 seconds later. 
He had the right of way. He was in the intersection 
while defendant was from 200 to 300 feet away. Plain-
tiff would not have been called upon to do anything 
different to protect himself or defendant. 
"How then is the situation when plaintiff ( 10 feet over 
into the northbound traffic lanes) sees defendant in a 
40 mile zone 150 feet away? What did plaintiff do 
then that he should not have done or what did he fail 
to do that he should have done? 
"Plaintiff testified that he speeded up a little. That 
would seem to have been prudent. His pick-up truck 
pretty well obstructed the inside lane of the north-
bound road. Had he stopped then as quickly as possi-
ble, his truck would have pretty well obstructed the 
high\vay. Had plaintiff's truck been so stopped it 
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would have required defendant to go off the highway 
on the north side or to cut in behind the pick-up and 
cross over onto the southbound lanes of traffic. 
"We believe the question of plaintiff's contributory 
negligence was a jury question which they resolved in 
plaintiff's favor. We are likewise satisfied that they 
correctly found that issue in favor of plaintiff." 
It is submitted the trial court acted properly in leaving 
the matter to the jury under proper instructions. 
The appellants' claim of error has no basis in law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts of the instant case show that the appellants' 
contention that the trial court should have directed aver-
dict in favor of appellants as a matter of law is without 
merit. The evidence discloses that the facts that had been 
found by the jury would justify the jury's verdict. The in-
stant situation is one where viewing the facts in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's decision, it would appear that 
the appellant's vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed, in 
apparent effort to make the light at the intersection, and 
with the pressure of additional money for additional trips, 
was responsible for the collision. The legal principles relied 
on by the appellants when viewed against the facts discloses 
that they are not entitled to relief on appeal. The jury had 
the chance to view the witnesses, to examine the exhibits 
and photographs, to determine the candor of the witnesses 
and concluded that judgment should be awarded to re-
spondent. The trial court, having heard the evidence first 
hand, determined that there was a jury question. The rec-
ord on appeal does not demonstrate that these nine reason-
able minds were completely unreasonable. 
This Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Respondents 
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